Fordham Law Mourns the Loss of Professor Gail D. Hollister '70

Gail Hollister was the most dedicated teacher I have ever known.  She did the unglamorous work - tutoring students who were struggling, reading hundreds of applications for admission, taking on administrative tasks, preparing for class. 

- GWC

Fordham Law Mourns the Loss of Professor Gail D. Hollister '70

The Fordham Law community is mourning the passing of Professor Gail D. Hollister ’70, longtime Archibald R. Murray Professor of Law and Murray Professor of Law Emerita. Hollister was a member of the Fordham Law faculty for 40 years—from 1977 until her retirement in 2017. She was chosen by Dean Emeritus and Norris Professor of Law John D. Feerick ’61 to serve as the first leader of the newly created student affairs office while serving as a full-time faculty member. Hollister was also named director of legal writing in 1982, was the first holder of the Archibald R. Murray Chair of Law, and was named the first associate dean of administration in 2001. She also proudly served as an advisory board member of The Feerick Center for Social Justice, beginning in 2017. Hollister died on April 29 at the age of 75. She is survived by her husband, Edward G. Williams, her son, Gregory P. Williams, and her daughter-in-law, Sarah R. Williams.

“Gail spent virtually her whole adult life at Fordham Law—as a student, member of the faculty and associate dean,” said Dean Matthew Diller. “One of her most admirable qualities was her devotion to the students, putting them first and always being there with her office door open to answer students’ questions.”

“Gail has earned accolades from students over the years for her brilliance, for knowing tort law inside and out, and for her ability to respond to students’ questions with clear examples,” he continued. “She was a consummate teacher of law and a wonderful colleague, and she will be sorely missed by all.”

Professor Hollister on her graduation day from Fordham Law School in 1970. Photo: Courtesy of Gregory Williams.

Hollister majored in political science and graduated from the University of Wisconsin in 1967. She earned a J.D. from Fordham Law in 1970 and was a member of the Fordham Law Review and the Law School’s social committee.

After graduating from Fordham Law, Hollister clerked for the late Judge Inzer B. Wyatt, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York. Hollister later was an associate at Webster, Sheffield, Fleischmann, Hitchcock & Brookfield, and practiced at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith where she specialized in securities regulation.

Hollister joined the Fordham Law School faculty the fall of 1977 under the leadership of Hon. Joseph McLaughlin, who served as dean from 1971 to 1981.

Federal Judge Strikes Down Eviction Moratorium - The New York Times

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Why the Supreme Court’s Unanimous FTC Decision Changes Everything | Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP - JDSupra

Why the Supreme Court’s Unanimous FTC Decision Changes Everything | Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP - JDSupra

The Supreme Court has just made it significantly more difficult for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to obtain monetary relief in enforcement actions, terminating a practice the FTC has engaged in for decades to exact monetary recoveries. Unless and until Congress legislates a change, the FTC may no longer proceed directly to federal court under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to do so, and, therefore, myriad contested judgments might need to be reopened.

What Happened

The applicable law has long been straightforward. Under the FTC Act, Congress granted the FTC authority to enforce the act’s prohibitions on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” (UDAPs) by commencing administrative proceedings pursuant to Section 5. FTC administrative proceedings are a two-step process in which the FTC initially obtains a cease-and-desist order from an administrative law judge which is subject to direct appeal to a federal court of appeals. Then, once a cease-and-desist order becomes final, the FTC may seek injunctive relief, civil penalties and other relief including consumer redress if the cease-and-desist order is violated. Importantly, such relief requires proof that “the act or practice to which the cease and desist order relates is one which a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent.”

In addition to administrative proceedings, the FTC may proceed directly to court in two circumstances. First, and applicable here, under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC is entitled to seek a “permanent injunction” when a defendant “is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the” FTC. Second, where an FTC rule has been violated, or after entry of a cease-and-desist order, the FTC may proceed directly to court and seek penalties and monetary relief including damages and consumer redress, pursuant to Section 19. However, these two direct suit remedies also have knowledge requirements; for example, in the absence of a prior FTC order, the agency must likewise establish that the defendant had “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule.”

Given these constraints, the FTC has for many decades taken the broad position that it is entitled to proceed directly to federal court to seek monetary penalties solely as part of the requested permanent injunctive relief, relying on Section 13(b) and the “equitable relief” provision in Section 5(l). While the statute itself dates back to 1914, Congress granted the FTC additional powers in 1973 to seek, directly, those court remedies and, in 1975, added Section 19 rights.