The Supreme Court is not being honest with you
Justice Amy Coney Barrett appears to be quite unfamiliar with her own judicial record, and that of her colleagues.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett appears to be quite unfamiliar with her own judicial record, and that of her colleagues.
Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with their employers?
His answer was:
“companies may require workers to settle employment disputes through individual arbitration rather than joining to press their complaints, a decision affecting as many as 25 million workers”
But Ruth Ginsburg, dissenting wrote:
T]he edict that employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only one-by-one does not come from Congress. It is the result of take-it-or-leave-it labor contracts harking back to the type called “yellow dog,” and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those unbargained-for agreements.
Though Epic Systems itself is largely untouched its embrace of "choice" will no longer apply to sexual harassment claims. In a major victory for employees they will no longer be forced to "consent" to arbitration of sexual harassment or assault cases. Even courts that have sought to preserve the right to go to court have sometimes failed. Thus in Skuse v. Pfizer a divided New Jersey Supreme Court in 2020 voted to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause compelled post-employment by the drug giant Pfizer, Inc..
9 U.S.C. § 401. Definitions
“In this chapter:
“(1) PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.—The term ‘predispute arbitration agreement’ means any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that has not yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement.
“(2) PREDISPUTE JOINT-ACTION WAIVER.—The term ‘predispute joint-action waiver’ means an agreement, whether or not part of a predispute arbitration agreement, that would prohibit, or waive the right of, one of the parties to the agreement to participate in a joint, class, or collective action in a judicial, arbitral, administrative, or other forum, concerning a dispute that has not yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement.
“(3) SEXUAL ASSAULT DISPUTE.—The term ‘sexual assault dispute’ means a dispute involving a nonconsensual sexual act or sexual contact, as such terms are defined in section 2246 of title 18 or similar applicable Tribal or State law, including when the victim lacks capacity to consent.
“(4) SEXUAL HARASSMENT DISPUTE.—The term ‘sexual harassment dispute’ means a dispute relating to any of the following conduct directed at an individual or a group of individuals:
“(C) Unwanted sexual attention, including unwanted sexual comments and propositions for sexual activity.
Ҥ 402. No validity or enforceability
“(a) In General.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual assault dispute or sexual harassment dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.
“(b) Determination Of Applicability.—An issue as to whether this chapter applies with respect to a dispute shall be determined under Federal law. The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such agreement, and irrespective of whether the agreement purports to delegate such determinations to an arbitrator.”.
By Ann Lipton
Previously, I announced that my paper, Capital Discrimination, would be forthcoming in the Houston Law Review, and had just been posted publicly to SSRN. As I explained in that post, the paper explores the problem of gender discrimination against women as business owners and capital providers, and proposes changes to both statutory law and common law fiduciary duties in order to address gender-based oppression in business.
The paper itself describes several business law cases from different jurisdictions, including Shawe v. Elting, a matter very familiar to business lawyers, and which involved an acrimonious dispute in the Delaware courts. Just before Christmas, an attorney representing Philip Shawe sent this cease and desist letter to SSRN, demanding that the paper be removed from that site as defamatory.
On New Year’s Day, SSRN removed the paper in response to Shawe’s letter. After that, Houston Law Review could no longer assure me that the article would run in its journal, and stated that they would not preclude me from submitting the paper for publication elsewhere.
Tulane’s counsel has sent a response letter to SSRN in hopes of having the paper restored but for now, to ensure that the paper is not kept out of sight indefinitely, I have made a copy available at this link. This draft of the paper includes a reference to Mr. Shawe’s defamation claims.