Friday, January 7, 2022

Conservative Justices Express Hostility To Biden Administration’s Power

Conservative Justices Express Hostility To Biden Administration’s Power Talking Points Memo

The conservative contingent of the Supreme Court questioned agencies’ ability to mandate the COVID-19 vaccine Friday, often asking why that power shouldn’t be left to Congress instead. 

“Why doesn’t Congress have a say in this, why isn’t it the primary responsibility of the states?” Chief Justice John Roberts asked, accusing the administration of using disparate agency mandates as a “workaround” to replace congressional action.

That positioning, made clear during oral arguments over two Biden administration vaccine mandates — one for health-care workers at facilities that get federal funding, and one vaccinate-or-test policy for large employers — formed another point of evidence for the increasingly conservative Court’s growing hostility toward executive branch authority, a shift experts have been tracking for years. 

Court watchers predicted that these mandate cases might provide clues about how the now-heavily conservative bench will react to the Biden administration’s attempts to enact policy through the rulemaking process.

Such antagonism towards agency power could prove paralyzing to the Biden administration, if either the current, nonfunctional Senate or a future Republican takeover of one or both chambers cuts off all ability to legislate. 

Many of the Republican appointees to the bench did in fact give voice to skepticism about agency power in general terms, while the small liberal contingent fought back. 

Critics of the movement to strip agencies of their authority have called the shift blatantly undemocratic, vesting judges with decision-making power over oftentimes complex and technical problems instead of the experts that lead those departments, picked by the President who is, in turn, elected by the people. Justice Elena Kagan became their mouthpiece Friday. 

“So who decides?” she asked. “Should it be the agency full of expert policy makers and completely politically accountable through the President?”

“On the one hand, the agency with their political leadership can decide — on the other, courts can decide,” she continued. “Courts are not politically accountable, courts have not been elected, courts have no epidemiological expertise.” 

“Why in the world would courts decide this question?” she asked incredulously.

Wednesday, January 5, 2022

The Emory Law Journal Finds My Distinguished Colleague’s Words “Hurtful and Unnecessarily Divisive”

The Emory Law Journal editors rightly withdrew an offensive, ill grounded and, yes, racist contribution to a "festschrift" .  But "conservative" commentators declare themselves offended by political correctness.
The Emory Law Journal Finds My Distinguished Colleague’s Words “Hurtful and Unnecessarily Divisive”

Thursday, December 30, 2021

Josh Chafetz John Roberts has strengthened GOP, weakened Conress, protected Trump

 Josh Chafetz (Georgetown) on the impact of John Roberts rulings have entrenched GOP power see (Rucho v. Common Cause - barring federal courts to partisan gerrymandering cases), Trump-protective (see immigration cases), and judicial power-enhancing (see judicial scrutiny of Congressional subpoenas).


Symposium on Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule’s “Law and Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State” Archives - Yale Journal on Regulation

OTHERWISE: Symposium on Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule’s “Law and Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State” Archives - Yale Journal on Regulation

Proud Boys, Oathkeepers sued by D.C.'s Racine over Jan. 6 riot - The Washington Post

Proud Boys, Oathkeepers sued by D.C.'s Racine over Jan. 6 riot - The Washington Post

D.C. Attorney General Karl A. Racine (D) on Tuesday sued the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers over the Jan. 6 attack on Congress, seeking to use a law written to cripple the Ku Klux Klan to seek stiff financial penalties from the far-right groups that Racine alleges were responsible for the violence.

The lawsuit filed in federal court in Washington cites the modern version of an 1871 law known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, which was enacted after the Civil War to safeguard government officials carrying out their duties and protect civil rights. Two similar suits have been filed already this year related to Jan. 6 — one by Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-Miss.), chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, and another by a number of police officers who fought the rioters that day.

Racine’s suit, however, is the first effort by a government agency to hold individuals and organizations civilly responsible for the violence at the U.S. Capitol on the day Congress ceremonially confirmed President Biden’s 2020 election victory.

Proud Boys, Oathkeepers sued by D.C.'s Racine over Jan. 6 riot - The Washington Post

Proud Boys, Oathkeepers sued by D.C.'s Racine over Jan. 6 riot - The Washington Post

D.C. Attorney General Karl A. Racine (D) on Tuesday sued the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers over the Jan. 6 attack on Congress, seeking to use a law written to cripple the Ku Klux Klan to seek stiff financial penalties from the far-right groups that Racine alleges were responsible for the violence.

The lawsuit filed in federal court in Washington cites the modern version of an 1871 law known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, which was enacted after the Civil War to safeguard government officials carrying out their duties and protect civil rights. Two similar suits have been filed already this year related to Jan. 6 — one by Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-Miss.), chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, and another by a number of police officers who fought the rioters that day.

Racine’s suit, however, is the first effort by a government agency to hold individuals and organizations civilly responsible for the violence at the U.S. Capitol on the day Congress ceremonially confirmed President Biden’s 2020 election victory.

Monday, December 27, 2021

Ninth Circuit judge questions fairness of $9 million for privacy groups in Google Street View settlement | Courthouse News Service

Ninth Circuit judge questions fairness of $9 million for privacy groups in Google Street View settlement | Courthouse News Service

SAN FRANCISCO (CN) — After ordering Google to pay privacy rights groups $9 million from a $13 million settlement over data collected by its Street View cars, a Ninth Circuit judge said her colleagues should rethink the practice of distributing the fruits of hard-fought class actions to charitable organizations and nonprofits in place of direct payments to class members.

U.S. Circuit Judge Bridget Bade, a Donald Trump appointee, wrote there is an “increasing skepticism” over whether injured class members actually benefit from seeing their settlement money go to third parties, especially when they may not have even heard of the organization.

This type of settlement is known as cy pres, a French legal term meaning “as near as possible,” and is typically adopted when it is impractical to distribute money to a class.

Thursday, December 16, 2021

LSN: Harvard Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Vol. 23 No. 4, 12/16/2021 - gconk@fordham.edu - Fordham University Mail

 Constitutional Hardball" Free Download

Forthcoming, Cambridge Handbook of ConstitutionalThoery (J. King & R.Bellamy eds.)
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 21-37

MARK TUSHNET, Harvard Law School
Email: mtushnet@law.harvard.edu

After defining the term constitutional hardball and examining how political actors defend specific examples of constitutional hardball, this Chapter examines why political actors engage in hardball, focusing first on their short-term political motivations and then turning to the function of constitutional hardball within reasonably well-functioning constitutional democracies. After examining how political actors defend hardball practices, it offers a “regime-centered” analysis, arguing that constitutional hardball is a signal of proposed or impending constitutional change, and the change might be for the better rather than for the worse. The Chapter ends with a discussion of what might be done to convert constitutional hardball into ordinary political maneuvering, concluding that such efforts are unlikely to succeed and might be inappropriate (though not illiberal) efforts to halt more or less ordinary transformations in political practices

LSN: Harvard Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Vol. 23 No. 4, 12/16/2021 - gconk@fordham.edu - Fordham University Mail

 The Unable or Unwilling Doctrine: A View From Private Law" Free Download

Harvard International Law Journal, Forthcoming
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 21-47

GABRIELLA BLUM, Harvard Law School
Email: gblum@law.harvard.edu
JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, Harvard Law School
Email: jgoldberg@law.harvard.edu

May a threatened state use force against armed nonstate actors situated in another state? Proponents of the “Unable or Unwilling Doctrine” (UUD) answer in the affirmative, provided that the territorial state in which the nonstate actors are based is either unable or unwilling to tackle the threat by itself. Opponents reject the UUD, arguing that it has no place within existing international law.

The intense, multi-layered debates over the UUD have thus far been grounded primarily in the international law of self-defense. Moreover, both proponents and opponents of the doctrine have tended to treat its two prongs as interchangeable, such that the legality of a use of force or the consequences that follow from it are unaffected by which of the two explains the territorial state’s failure to negate the threat to the targeted state. This article challenges both of these features of UUD analysis.

Our first contention is that, while states enjoy limited leeway to use defensive force against nonstate actors in another state’s territory, the prerogative to enter the territorial state without other authorization is rooted in principles of necessity, not self-defense. In turn—and here we reach our second main contention—grounding the UUD in necessity suggests that, for cases in which the territorial state is unable, rather than unwilling, to deal with the threat, the threatened state is obligated to compensate the territorial state for its unpermitted entry, as well as for any resulting personal injury or property damage (other than harm to legitimate targets). Our third contribution is to explain why compensation might be owed, as a matter of equity, even in circumstances in which a state can claim, reasonably, that it bears no international legal responsibility.

All of these claims, we contend, are bolstered by interpreting international law through the lens of private law, particularly the Anglo-American law of tort and restitution and its rules for the imposition of liability in cases of “private necessity.”

LSN: Harvard Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Vol. 23 No. 4, 12/16/2021 - gconk@fordham.edu - Fordham University Mail

What's the Harm of Trademark Infringement?" Free Download
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2015
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 21-41

REBECCA TUSHNET, Harvard Law School
Email: rtushnet@law.harvard.edu

This Article explores the classic harm theories of trademark infringement that don't involve sales substitution and argues that courts should recognize their empirical weakness. Despite the expansion of infringement liability based on new theories of such harm, questions about what constitutes trademark harm are now being reexamined at the remedy stage. These changes are positive to the extent that they make courts rethink overly expansive models of trademark confusion.