Monday, October 26, 2020

Adam Liptak NYT Deep Dive into the Shadow Docket and the Purcell Principle: “Missing From Supreme Court’s Election Cases: Reasons for Its Rulings” | Election Law Blog

The `Purcell Principle':
“Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter identification procedures just weeks before an election, the Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or non-issuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures,” the unsigned opinion said. “Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, per curiam, 549 U.S. 1 (2006)
Adam Liptak NYT Deep Dive into the Shadow Docket and the Purcell Principle: “Missing From Supreme Court’s Election Cases: Reasons for Its Rulings” | Election Law Blog

New Sidebar NYT column from Adam Liptak:

At least nine times since April, the Supreme Court has issued rulings in election disputes. Or perhaps “rulings” is too generous a word for those unsigned orders, which addressed matters as consequential as absentee voting during the pandemic in AlabamaSouth Carolina and Texas, and the potential disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of people with felony convictions in Florida.

Most of the orders, issued on what scholars call the court’s “shadow docket,” did not bother to supply even a whisper of reasoning.

“This idea of unexplained, unreasoned court orders seems so contrary to what courts are supposed to be all about,” said Nicholas Stephanopoulos, a law professor at Harvard. “If courts don’t have to defend their decisions, then they’re just acts of will, of power. They’re not even pretending to be legal decisions.”…

If the court is going to treat emergency applications with something like equal care, it might consider explaining what it is doing. Explaining, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook wrote in 2000, is what distinguishes judges from politicians.

“The political branches of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason,” he wrote. “Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat, which requires compelling justification.” Terse rulings on emergency applications are not new. But “the shadow docket has truly exploded in the last few years,” Stephen I. Vladeck, a law professor at the University of Texas, wrote on Scotusblog last week.

The Trump administration has been a major contributor to the trend, Professor Vladeck wrote, having filed 36 emergency applications in its first three and a half years. By contrast, the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama filed just eight such applications over 16 years.

More recently, emergency applications in voting cases have spiked. Lower courts have struggled to make sense of the court’s orders, which are something less than precedents but nonetheless cannot be ignored by responsible judges….

The passage in the Purcell ruling that has been boiled down to the shadow doctrine of a near-categorical bar on late-breaking adjustments to state election procedures by federal courts was three sentences long. It was not at all clear, but it suggested that judges should balance competing interests and use judgment.

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