42 U.S.C. 1983 provides a cause of action for state policies that deny citizens rights under the Constitution and laws. John Thompson alleges that the New Orleans District Attorney's failure to train prosecutors in their obligations under Brady v. Maryland (to provide the defense with all exculpatory material) caused him to be wrongfully convicted of robbery and murder. He recovered a verdict and an equally divided Fifth Circuit en banc affirmed.
Is this consistent with the common law principle of absolute prosecutorial immunity from suit extended to claims under 42 USC 1983 as enunciated emphatically in Imbler v. Pachtman (1976)? Or will it prove to be the vindication of Justice Byron "Whizzer" White who concurred in the result but warned:
I write, however, because I believe that the Court's opinion may be read as extending to a prosecutor an immunity broader than that to which he was entitled at common law; broader than is necessary to decide this case; and broader than is necessary to protect the judicial process. Most seriously, I disagree with any implication that absolute immunity for prosecutors extends to suits based on claims of unconstitutional suppression of evidence, because I believe such a rule would threaten to injure the judicial process and to interfere with Congress' purpose in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without any support in statutory language or history.
The Thompson case is one in a line of § 1983 cases in which state entities' failure to train evidences an actionable "deliberate indifference" to the rights of citizens . In an amicus brief a group of law school criminal justice and legal ethics centers argues that the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is so complex that without training constitutional violations are inevitable, and deliberate indifference can thus be shown.
The case is competently presented by Jessica Fitts, a Harvard law student, writing for ScotusBlog:
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