Déjà-vu? The National Commission Report on BP’s Gulf Disaster Echoes Old Findings - ProPublica
From the 2003 report from the Scottish Environment Protection Agency following a series of accidents and fires at BP’s huge refinery in Grangemouth, Scotland, in 2000.
The “incidents would not have occurred if BP’s high standards and policies and procedures been followed consistently across the complex.” (Sic)
“The tendency was to place relatively high emphasis on short-term benefits of cost and speed and to be readier to make compromises over longer term issues like plant reliability. Management was perceived by technicians as hurried, and managers expressed similar concerns about technicians.”
“The company did not adequately measure the major accident hazard potential. … BP did not apply the required degree of expertise to some key technical tasks and had no overall plan as to what resources of technically competent people were required to manage the major accident hazards effectively.”
“Control of major accident hazards requires a specific focus on process safety management over and above conventional safety management. … The investigation also found that there was a more optimistic perception of safety performance than might be borne out.”
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